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Abstract. The paper examines the recent developments in the high-technology manufacturing 
sectors in the EU28 countries, focusing on the β-convergence of gross value added in the Manu-
facture of computers, electronic, and optical products, and the Manufacture of basic pharmaceuti-
cal products and pharmaceutical preparations. We employ two dynamic panel models estimated 
using the system of generalized method of moments (GMM) to address the risk of an endogeneity 
bias. The panel data analysis indicates a higher convergence for the Manufacture of computer, 
electronic, and optical products at 16.4% compared to 2.2% for the Manufacture of basic phar-
maceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations, which is consistent with the existence of 
fewer barriers and higher exposure to competition in the case of the first analyzed sector. In the 
context of the role of the high-technology manufacturing industries as an engine of growth and 
the existing performance differences between the EU28 countries in terms of gross value added 
in the analyzed sectors, we investigated the β-convergence for two groupings EU15 and the new 
EU member states. We found that the new EU member states display a higher β-convergence rate 
than EU15, but also that they have a lower capital intensity. The result highlights the potential 
risk of some of the new EU member states becoming laggers in terms of the underlying factors 
behind gross value added as investment and labour force.
Keywords: high-tech manufacturing, gross value added per firm, investment, labour force, capital 
intensity, convergence, dynamic panel models. 
JEL Classification: L69, O47, O33.
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Introduction 
The world is facing a new challenge at the beginning of the fourth industrial revolution. After 
the steam engine, electricity, the emergence of computers, and digital technology, the ongoing 
industrial revolution is characterized by the fusion of advances in many technologies, e.g., 
robotics, artificial intelligence, Internet of Things, quantum computing, 3D printing, nano-
technology, biotechnology, etc. The complexity of the production processes has increased as 
the world moves toward a new industrial revolution. The new revolution will occur at an 
exponential rate as a result of the deeply interconnected world we live in and the fact that 
these technologies will amplify each other as they develop and will create transformative 
changes in many economic sectors (Schwab, 2016; World Economic Forum [WEF], 2016; 
Park, 2018). These changes will reshape the consumption and production pattern and will 
imply radical changes in all industries, disruptive technologies being considered the enabler 
of a more abundant world (Maresch & Gartner, 2020). 
Both the development and diffusion of innovation are faster in the fourth industrial revo-
lution. However, beyond its speed, returns to scale are also important, and they are the result 
of the automation processes. It refers to fully integrating information and computer technol-
ogy (ICT) and automation technology into production and, consequently, to the integration 
in the value-added chain with the aid of digitalization. This enables real-time readjustments 
owing to highly flexible processes. Notably, in manufacturing, networking and increased 
transparency facilitate working in embedded systems and shifting from centralized to local 
production (KPMG, 2016). 
Historically, the manufacturing industry has played a key role in ensuring sustainable 
economic growth. Recent technological changes have led to profound adjustments of the 
production processes at the economic sector level with a negative effect on employment, 
especially for the low-skilled labour force. In addition, the integration of the manufactur-
ing industry into the global value chain has become a challenge for economies that are not 
globally competitive. In the case of the manufacturing industry, compared to other sectors, 
capital, skills, and technological complexity of produced goods play a key role in the decision 
to relocate productive capacity. As a consequence, the economies in which the manufactur-
ing industry can thrive are characterized by a highly skilled labour force and an investment 
environment, including here competitive venture capital. These characteristics suggest that 
the manufacturing industry is at a critical point, especially in economies that need to become 
more competitive.
Economic growth and employment characteristics are impacted by the structure and 
dynamics of production. Under the current challenges of climate change, the production 
processes are also adjusting. The efforts are focused mainly in countries with high innovation 
potential, but all countries make efforts to be more innovative to become more competitive 
in global markets. 
This paper aims to investigate the recent developments in the high technology manufac-
turing sectors in the European Union countries. Globalization, increased competition, and 
the rapid growth of developing countries raise the question of the role of the high technology 
sectors as an engine of economic growth and their role in the catching-up process. In this 
vain, the economic convergence of the new EU member states increasingly depends on their 
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performance in the high-technology manufacturing sectors, which is becoming a critical 
driving force of growth. Against this background, this paper investigated the beta conver-
gence of gross value added in the high-technology manufacturing industries in the EU28 
countries as well as for the EU15 and the new EU member states groupings. We used the 
aggregation of high-technology manufacturing, based on NACE Rev.2 at 2-digits level1 and 
analyzed the β convergence of gross value added in the Manufacture of computer, electronic, 
and optical products, and the Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharma-
ceutical preparations. To this end, we use two dynamic panel models based on the system of 
generalized method of moments (GMM) to tackle the endogeneity bias issue. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section comprises the literature 
review on high-tech manufacturing and its implications, Section 2 provides an overview of 
the high-tech manufacturing industry in the EU, Section 3 describes the methodology, data 
used and investigates the results. The last section provides the conclusion.
1. High-tech manufacturing – theoretical framework 
1.1. Technological changes – implication to manufacturing industry
In the context of the manufacturing industry’s fundamental role as a driving force of eco-
nomic growth, it is important to investigate the impact of recent technological changes on 
this industry and its component activities. The new technologies reduce the labour force 
directly involved in the production processes, also generating a reduction of the total costs. 
This is a challenge for economies that traditionally have relied on labour costs to ensure 
competitiveness and force these economies to adopt new technologies to remain competitive. 
In some industries (e.g., automotive industry) a major part of the work is done by robots. In 
other industries, the work volume is too low, or the production patterns change too rapidly 
in response to new demands or innovation (e.g. small-scale manufacturing or relatively ad-
vanced industries) to make the automation process worthwhile (Knight, 2012). 
The role of manufacturing as an economic sector continues to evolve, both in develop-
ing and developed countries. For developing countries, it ensures higher productivity and 
increasing living standards for the labour force transitioning out of agriculture. For developed 
countries, it acts as a driving force for productivity, innovation, export, and competitive-
ness. As economies develop, manufacturing also becomes important in reducing resource 
consumption and energy use, therefore, addressing environmental concerns. The sector is 
and will be energized by information technology, new production processes, innovations 
in production, and materials that will lead to the development of new products but also to 
improving, reinventing, or changing the existing ones (Manyika et al., 2012). Technologies 
have a major impact on production systems through the increased level of automation, which 
benefits both the producers (speed, quality, diversification, precision, small lot size, the cost, 
and productivity etc.) and employees (increasing safety in the usage of the technologies, 
user-friendly interfaces, etc.).
1 High-technology manufacturing based on NACE Rev. 2 at 2-digits level is comprised of only the two sectors 
analyzed in this paper.
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The manufacturing sector success depends on a range of factors such as access to the 
highly skilled labour force and access to the low-cost labour force, access to an efficient 
transportation and logistics infrastructure, proximity to demand, availability and low prices 
of resources and energy, and the possibility to access innovation (Manyika et al., 2012).
The manufacturing industry is an engine of economic development, stimulating the 
competitiveness of the economy. From a historical perspective, there is a significant correla-
tion between the dynamics of the manufacturing industry and the growth of GDP. Kaldor 
(Kaldor, 1966) investigated the existence of a positive relationship between the increase in 
production of the manufacturing industry and the GDP growth. Recent studies show that 
countries with the highest GDP per capita growth are countries that have also recorded 
significant increases in value added and employment in the manufacturing industry (Hall-
ward-Driemeier & Gaurav, 2017; Szirmai & Verspagen, 2015; Fagerberg & Verspagen, 1999). 
Other studies (Fagerberg et al., 2009; Cappelen et al., 2000) examined the impact of new 
technologies on productivity, employment, and gross value added in specific sectors of the 
manufacturing industry. 
The new technologies, especially automation, have a negative impact on employment, 
mainly on the medium and low skills labour force (Acemoglu & Autor, 2011; Mokyr et al., 
2015). In terms of value added, the effect of introducing new technologies is positive, espe-
cially for companies that are integrated into the global value chain (Low & Pasadilla, 2016; 
Hallward-Driemeier & Nayyar, 2017). 
The emergence of high technologies has accelerated the sustainable transformation of 
manufacturing industry and moved traditional manufacturing away from labour intensive, 
low-skill jobs and low added value towards high-skill jobs, high value-added and high-quality 
production (Bell, 1973; Zheng et al., 2020). This relocation currently entails moving from 
low-tech to high-tech, calling for an increased importance of research and development and 
a higher share of associated expenditure in total expenditures (Kelley et al., 2004). This con-
clusion contradicts the assumption that low or inadequate productivity is responsible for the 
low manufacturing competitiveness (Krugman & Lawrence, 1994). The IMF found that the 
decline in manufacturing employment characterises the successful economic development 
and is associated with increased living standards. They conclude, based on a sample consist-
ing of the US and other developed countries, that deindustrialization is associated with high 
productivity growth in manufacturing (Rowthorn & Ramaswamy, 1997).
In manufacturing, the core jobs follow well-defined repetitive operations and, as a re-
sult, can easily be performed by computers/robots and be codified using computer software 
(Acemoglu & Autor, 2011). Even under these circumstances, the gains from using technolo-
gies are distributed in a manner that gradually benefits a growing share of the labour force 
(Frey & Osborne, 2017). Referring to the convergence of the robot density in manufacturing 
industries in EU, Jungmittag (2021) showed that country specific factors did not influence 
the speed of catching-up process and convergence of densities of industrial robots in manu-
facturing industries. The author also suggests that the intensified deployment of robots does 
not slow down the convergence of labour market productivities in EU.
Increasing productivity due to innovation and new technologies led to an employment 
decrease in manufacturing and rising output. Especially in developed economies, the employ-
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ment in manufacturing as a share of total employment will decrease due to productivity gains 
and increased competition, which determine the specialization in highly skilled activities. In 
addition, as the service sector is growing, the share of manufacturing in total employment 
decreases. 
As long as the industry is more competitive, the production costs and output prices fall. 
A sign of high-tech industry maturing is the decline of employment and value added per 
employee. High-tech manufacturing value added is evidence of an industry in ascension. 
Its decline suggests that products become routine or lower margin. As a result, as economic 
conditions change rapidly, high-tech manufacturing’s current performance does not guar-
antee the same future success. There are factors enabling continuous performance increases 
in high-tech manufacturing as a source of advancement and powerful technologies (Kelley 
et al., 2004):
 – R&D – is essential for developing cutting-edge innovation and for emerging technol-
ogies and for strengthening the role of disruptive technologies in manufacturing and 
other economic sectors;
 – adequate education for the development and use of new technologies. The highly 
skilled labour force is more flexible in adapting to the rapidly changing environment;
 – digitalisation, automation, and technology impact all production processes in the 
high-tech manufacturing sector and foster the deployment of production in an inte-
grated, flexible, intelligent, and efficient manner (KPMG, 2016);
Under these circumstances, the new production technologies will favourably impact the 
firm performance and productivity and will increase the value added (Gillani et al., 2020). 
These new technologies will also be adapted to the environmental needs of current and 
future societies. Both producers and governments have to adapt to the new technologies. 
For producers, this implies rethinking and retooling their internal activities and for govern-
ments reassessing their competitive advantages and development strategies. To position their 
economies on a path of sustainable growth, governments should be able to i) set policies 
to encourage and help the development and diffusing of new technologies, ii) deliver the 
needed education and lifelong learning programs for the labour force and iii) develop the 
infrastructure (WEF, 2017). New technologies also contribute to sustainability, directly or 
indirectly, and studies showed that developed countries successfully achieved sustainability 
in manufacturing sectors, while the rate of sustainability adoption in developing countries is 
significantly poorer (Yadav et al., 2020).
1.2. Importance of the convergence process in EU – Towards smart manufacturing
The fourth industrial revolution will enable smart factories, smart and connected machines, 
and systems. Industry 4.0, Smart Manufacturing, Smart Factory are concept resulted from 
the propagation in global manufacturing of the fourth industrial revolution. 
Smart Manufacturing is a concept introduced in the United States to highlight the role of 
information in addressing the increased variability of the industry. It becomes the focus of 
global manufacturing, transformation, and upgrading (Qi & Tao, 2018). In this vain, smart 
manufacturing technologies aim at delivering the right information at the right time and 
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reduce the risk of technology adoption and development. It is considered the core of the 
modern production and manufacturing industry as it is moving towards digitalization (Lee 
et al., 2020), bringing speed and flexibility (Cioffi et al., 2020). The final objectives of Smart 
Manufacturing are high quality and efficiency, energy savings, environmental sustainabili-
ty, economic, and social development (Lu et al., 2016). Production flows needs to become 
increasingly flexible, intelligent, and reconfigurable. The intelligent manufacturing industry 
requires certain basic technologies that will allow the equipment and machines to adapt 
their behaviour in response to different situations and needs, taking into account previous 
experience and the capacity to acquire new knowledge. 
The focus of a successful high-tech manufacturing sector should be to maintain the speed 
of transformation and this requires a good and fast adaptation of technologies within the 
business process to create value. The deployment of new high technologies, their high initial 
costs, and new services associated, etc. lead to a new trend in business management reflecting 
rapid changes and the need of adjustment to the new changing business environment. This 
creates a network where the technologies are increasing separated from production activities 
(Piech & Radosevic, 2006; Zheng et al., 2019), Manufacturing as a Service becoming a very 
popular business model which provides better and most cost-effective solutions. These types 
of services are more likely to develop in high-tech manufacturing, considering their impact 
on innovation, research, and development. Manufacturing as a Service includes benefits like 
faster and less expensive new technologies, a better-balanced workload for producers, and 
supports producers who cannot yet bid on individual projects. These potential benefits open 
a wide range of business models for manufacturers like design, equipment, management, 
maintenance, simulation, etc., all provided as a service (Microsoft Dynamics, 2019). At the 
EU level, the manufacturing industry aims to contribute to social and environmental sustain-
ability, impacting growth and jobs. For addressing these challenges, increased cooperation 
between government and industry is needed. Technological innovation steaming from high-
tech manufacturing plays a key role in transforming new products into competitive, acces-
sible, and affordable new products. Without these features or as a result of the late entrance 
to the market, these new products cannot generate value added for society. The channels for 
creating value within a society can be different: endowment with natural resources, increased 
food production, and service delivery. For the EU, the manufacturing industry is essential for 
generating value as it has already almost maximised its food production and the potential 
of increasing employment and productivity in the services sector is also limited. The EU is 
the leading global manufacturing sector not in terms of market share, but in terms of the 
factories of the future (European Commission, 2013). 
The role of technology in supporting the transition of manufacturing to greater resource 
efficiency and the need to ensure that ICTs and innovative ideas are used for new products to 
create jobs and growth were already stressed at EU level (European Commission, 2010). The 
EU manufacturing needs to increase its capacity for creative destruction and reallocation of 
resources, which implies investment and reallocation within manufacturing to sectors, activ-
ities with higher value added (Veugelers, 2017). High-tech manufacturing implies structural 
changes in the economy, impacting producers, consumers, and society as a whole (Figure 1). 
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The rapid economic growth of developing countries raises questions on the sustainability 
of economic convergence. The economic growth potential depends both on the creation of 
new economic sectors as well as on the internal transformation of those that already exist 
(Smith, 2002). Under these circumstances, technological advances are of major importance in 
driving economic growth in the EU. The technological adaptation and technological changes 
become a dominant feature of the convergence process within the EU (Chen & Dahlman, 
2004; Assuncao et al., 2015). Rodrick (Rodrik, 2011a, 2011b) found that technologies spread 
more rapidly between industrial sectors than across economies and, as a result, industrial sec-
tors are more likely to converge compared to countries. Lack of digital strategy and resource 
scarcity emerged as barriers to the implementation of high technologies both in developed 
and developing countries, while improvement of government regulations (in developing 
countries) and technological infrastructure (in developed countries) are needed to promote 
the adoption of these technologies (Raj et al., 2020).
A recent study examines the convergence of countries in terms of productivity, high-
lighting that the better initial level of education, higher institutional quality, political stabil-
ity, greater complexity of economies, policies that encourage participation in global value 
chains have influenced, since 2000, the transition of countries to the group of high level 
convergence countries, contributing to the reduction of the existing gaps (Kindberg-Hanlon 
& Okou, 2020). Also, the impact of local specific factors and macroeconomic characteristics 
were found as positively influencing the recovery after recession for high convergence club 
countries from EU (Mazzola & Pizzuto, 2020). Other studies analyzed the positive impact of 
innovation and international trade for the convergence process in developing countries from 
Central and Easter Europe (Grela et al., 2017). 
Figure 1. Analyzed transmission channels
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To ensure economic growth and development, new technologies should be used in con-
junction with measures to enable economies to take advantage of new production opportuni-
ties and to reduce the development gaps within the EU. The next step should be to shift from 
using new technologies to the development and deployment of new technologies (Magacho 
& McCombie, 2018). In this respect, the necessary ingredients are (Dahlman & Andersson, 
2000; Freeman, 2002):
 –  an economic and institutional framework providing incentives for the deployment 
and use of new technologies;
 – a skilled labour force is able to develop, use, and improve new technologies;
 – an efficient communication and transportation infrastructure; 
 – an innovative society both at the public and private level adapting new technologies 
to changing needs.
The gap between developed and developing countries can be reduced by a mix of organ-
isational factors. The availability of new technologies at the EU level may not imply the im-
mediate shift to high-tech manufacturing or high-tech services if the national economies do 
not have the appropriate competencies, skills, institutions, and other supporting conditions 
(e.g. transportation and communication infrastructure) (Eliasson et al., 2004). Productivity 
improvements as a result of new technologies are accompanied by labour market changes 
(skills and organisation of work) (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
[OECD], 2001). The high-tech manufacturing industry can promote economic growth as a 
result of increased productivity and structural changes. Consequently, new technologies act 
as enablers of growth and catching-up process in developing economies (Battisti et al., 2018).
2. The high-tech manufacturing industry in the European Union – an overview
At the EU level, the activities of the manufacturing industry are grouped into three categories 
according to their technological intensity, considering also the high technology and biotech-
nological patents (Eurostat, 2018): High-technology, Medium-technology (including Medi-
um-high-technology and Medium-low-technology) and Low-technology (Eurostat, 2021). 
The high-technology activities were grouped on the basis of the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC). The patents were grouped on the basis of the International Patent Clas-
sification (IPC). High-tech industries are defined by Eurostat according to their technological 
intensity and aggregated based on NACE Rev. 2. At 2-digit level, the high-tech manufacturing 
industries are Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical prepara-
tions (C21) and Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical products (C26).
Statistical data are publicly available at the manufacturing industry’s aggregate level of 
activity and are not available for each technology. This did not allow the analysis of the dis-
aggregated impact at the technology level, but only the analysis of the impact at the aggregate 
level of the technological groups according to their characteristics. 
The evolution of the manufacturing industry activities grouped by technological intensity 
reflects the impact of technology on employment and gross added value (GVA). Because 
some countries do not have data on gross value added for 2019 (9 from 28), we will focus our 
analysis on 2018, for which only 3 countries, Luxembourg, Ireland, and Malta do not have 
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publicly available data. The high-technology manufacturing activities are predominantly lo-
cated in the developed countries of Western and Central Europe: Denmark (34.3%), Belgium 
(17.2%), Hungary (15.4%), Cyprus (14.9%), Finland (14.6%) and Slovenia (14.5%) (Figure 2). 
Romania has the lowest share of high-technology activities, respectively, 3.3% compared to 
the EU average of 11.7% in 2018. Moreover, the structure of the manufacturing industry in 
Romania is atypical: the share of medium-technology manufacturing is 41.8%, above the 
EU28 average: 27.3%. 
The results are in accordance with the relative specialization index, which indicates that 
Romania’s manufacturing industry is the least specialized in terms of high-tech industries 
among the analysed countries (Figure 3). The relative specialization index2 is calculated based 
on the standard Balassa (1965) index to assess the technological content of manufacturing 
industries. It is determined by reporting the share of manufacturing sector by technological 
intensity GVA (High Technology, Medium Technology or Low Technology) in the total man-
ufacturing GVA to the share of the same manufacturing industry in the total manufactur-
ing industry. Western and Central European countries are, on average, the best performers. 
Romania also experienced a decrease in the degree of specialization in high-tech industries 
during the transition period and subsequently during the European Union’s pre-accession 
period. After the EU accession, the integration in the European value chain and in the Euro-
pean single market played a positive role for the Romanian manufacturing industry.
2 =
/






 where: GVAij is Gross value added of country j of manufacturing sector i (High Technology, Medium Technol-
ogy or Low Technology); GVAMj is GVA of country j of Manufacturing industry as a whole; GVAi is GVA of 
manufacturing sector i in EU; GVAM is GVA of manufacturing industry in EU.
Figure 2. The manufacturing industry structure based on GVA by technological intensity, 2018 
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For a better understanding of the high-tech manufacturing industry performance, we 
will review the most important indicators characterizing the industry. Companies’ turnover, 
according to Eurostat, in the high-tech manufacturing industry in Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
France, and United Kingdom represented 75.78% of the total high-tech manufacturing turn-
over of EU countries included in the analysis in 2017 and 83.13% in 2018. The gross value 
added of the high-tech manufacturing industry in Belgium, Germany, Italy, France and Unit-
ed Kingdom represented 80.89% of the total value added in the EU high-tech manufacturing 
in 2017 and 81.59 % in 2018. If we analyse the turnover per enterprise, the highest value 
is recorded in France EUR 58.1 million in 2017 and EUR 60.3 million in 2018 followed by 
Belgium with EUR 49.4 million in 2017 and EUR 58.9 million in 2018, and Germany EUR 
22.12 million in 2017 and EUR 24.28% million in 2018. Romania is below the median, with 
EUR 3.4 million in 2017 and EUR 4.1 million in 2018. 
In terms of gross added value per enterprise, the highest values were recorded in Den-
mark (EUR 18.3 million in 2017 and 19.0 million in 2018) followed by Belgium (EUR 15.6 
million in 2017 and EUR 18.95 million in 2018), and Finland (EUR 10.2 million in 2017 
and 8.5 million in 2018). 
While the value added and personnel costs increased, the absolute number of jobs in the 
EU manufacturing has declined mostly as a result of offshoring to Asia, which has slowed 
lately (Barbieri et al., 2018). The employment in high-tech manufacturing as percentage of 
total employment in the manufacturing industry is very low in Eastern and Baltic countries 
(e.g., Portugal 3.4%, Lithuania 2.1%, Latvia 4.4%, Romania 4.4%) in 2020. The employment 
in high-tech manufacturing for all EU New Member States is below the average of EU coun-
tries included in the analysis (6.7% of employment in the manufacturing industry), excepting 
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Figure 3. Industrial relative specialization index, 2018  
(source: author computation based on Eurostat, 2021)
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As manufacturing is shifting to high-tech production, the job profile will shift towards 
higher value-added jobs, determining a structural change in the labour market. The edu-
cational system needs to ensure a better correlation of supply and demand on the labour 
market taking into account the increased demand for a highly skilled labour force (engineers, 
technical workers, etc.) in high-tech manufacturing. Considering the challenge of ageing in 
the EU, the education policies should provide an efficient lifelong learning process, increasing 
the number of retraining programs and vocational training. The change in the labour market 
composition, namely, the increasing share of highly skilled workers in total employment, 
highlights the role of skills and their positive impact on the value added in the manufactur-
ing industry.
The high-tech manufacturing sector employs new innovative technologies to meet the 
demand for new products and improve the manufacturing processes’ efficiency. The job 
structure in manufacturing has changed due to automation, robotics, better transportation, 
information technology, etc. In the EU, 25.2% of employed in manufacturing have tertiary 
education, while in high-tech manufacturing, the share of tertiary educated personnel is 
higher at 46.4% (Figure 5). A larger percentage of tertiary education in high-tech manu-
facturing compared to manufacturing is recorded in all EU countries. These characteristics 
highlight the importance of adaptability and skills in high-tech manufacturing.
The strategic role of research and development (R&D) in the manufacturing industry has 
increased, reflecting new technological opportunities and competitive pressures. The Council 
of the European Union stated that the EU economy should be focused on enhancing human 
capital, research and development, innovation, and digital transformation to tackle the sus-
tainability and competitiveness challenges efficiently (European Council, 2017). Increasing 
share of the high-tech manufacturing in the economy depends on reinforcing public re-
search and building research and development (R&D) infrastructure at the enterprise level. 
Northern EU countries are the best performers in terms of enterprise R&D expenditure in 
high-tech manufacturing (Figure 6).
Figure 4. Share of employment based on technology sectors in total employment in manufacturing  
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Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations (C21) 
encompasses a chain of public and private organisations that discover, develop, and manufac-
ture medicines. More than any other industry, this manufacturing sector is highly dependent 
on research and development (Mikulic, 2021). The high technologies accelerate the discov-
ery, and development of new products with high therapeutic effects and reduced associated 
risks. The companies in pharmaceutical industries operate in multinational markets and their 
activities are subject to various regulations and policies (Spilker, 1994; International Labour 
Organization [ILO], 2012). The value added in this sector represents 5.58% of the total man-
ufacturing sector value added (Figure 7). Belgium and Denmark record the highest levels at 
Figure 6. Business enterprise R&D expenditure in manufacturing and in high-tech manufacturing  
(as % of total R&D expenditure), 2017 (source: author computation based on Eurostat, 2021)
Figure 5. Share of tertiary education (levels 5–8) in total employment in manufacturing  
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17.75% and 20.4%, respectively. Some of the New Member States record the lowest values: 
Estonia 0.33%, Slovakia 0.47%, Czech Republic 1.08%, Poland 1.42%, and Romania 1.94%. 
The apparent labour productivity (calculated as GVA per person employed) in this sector at 
the EU level represents 183.7% of the EU manufacturing sector average. The best performers 
are also the Northern countries, which record levels above EU average (Finland 328%, Bel-
gium 314%, or Denmark 258.9% compared to the manufacturing sector).
The manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products (C26) covers four main 
subsectors, i.e., electronic components and boards; computers and peripheral equipment; 
communication equipment; consumer electronics. The sector is characterized by strong glob-
al competition and a short product life cycle, which emphasizes the role of R&D. The sector 
is also continuously changing not only as a result of international competition but also as a 
result of the increasing diversification of customer preferences and increasing miniaturization 
of components. The skills mix depends on the R&D intensity and the degree of competi-
tiveness of the sector: new member states have more assemblers, mechanics, or machinery 
workers, while the EU-15 has a more skilled labour force like engineers, professionals etc. 
(European Commission, 2001, 2009). Aggregated data at the EU level for 2018 indicate that 
the sector gross value added at EUR 89.16 billion represented 3.82% of GVA in manufac-
turing (Figure 7), Hungary, and the Netherland record the highest levels: 9.5% and 6.25% in 
total manufacturing, followed by Estonia 5.67%, Denmark 5.57%, Finland 5.44%, Germany 
5.43%, France 5.15%. The lowest values are recorded by Greece 1.13%, Spain 1.31%, Portu-
gal 1.88%, Sweden 2.11%, Poland 2.31%, Italy 2.57%, and Romania 2.92%. At the EU level, 
the apparent labour productivity (calculated as GVA per person employed) in this sector 
represents 126.02% of the manufacturing sector’s labour productivity. The best performing 
EU countries are Netherland 176.2%, Denmark 125.6%, Belgium 121.9%, Austria 112.5%, 
France 96.5%, Germany 90.6%. 
Figure 7. High-tech manufacturing performance, 2018  
(source: author computation based on Eurostat, 2021)
Note: Only countries that have data reported for 2018 were considered in 
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3. Methodology, results, and discussion
3.1. Data and methods
The paper investigates the β-convergence (beta convergence) of gross value added in high-
technology manufacturing industries, focusing on the Manufacture of computer, electronic, 
and optical products and the Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharma-
ceutical preparations. The explanatory variables considered in the analysis were: (i) gross 
value added (GVA) per firms; (ii) gross fixed capital formation; (iii) the investment rate as 
a proxi for capital (Baldacci et al., 2004; Levine & Renelt, 1992; Qu et al., 2017) and a key 
determining variable in the accumulation of the physical capital stock (Kaldor, 1957); (iv) 
the labour force, expressed in terms of total hours worked (Table 1). This was preferred over 
the number of persons employed to account for the different working time regimes (Hsieh 
& Klenov, 2010; Aghion & Howitt, 2007). The data was taken from Eurostat and covered the 
period 2005 to 2018.
The analysis of the beta convergence of gross value added in the high-technology man-
ufacturing industries was based on two dynamic panel models estimated using the GMM 
method to address the possible presence of an endogeneity bias. Both fixed-effects IV and 
OLS estimators are vulnerable to biases (Roodman, 2006), prompting the use of lagged values 
of the endogenous variable as instruments. The approach allows tackling the endogeneity 
and measurement errors in the case of lagged endogenous variables as well as in the case of 
other explanatory variables.
To check the consistency of the estimators obtained using GMM, we considered two 
specification tests, namely, Arellano and Bond serial correlation test, which tests for first- and 
second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors and the Sargan test of overiden-
tifying restrictions, which examines the overall validity of the instruments by comparing the 
moment conditions to their sample analogue.
The paper used the standard β-convergence approach. As in Sala-i-Martin (1996) we as-
sumed coefficient a to be constant across economies and β-convergence to hold for all the 
economies in the panel. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )−= + −β +, , 1 ,l ,n 1 lni t i t i ty a y u  (1)
where 0 < β < 1, and the errors u have mean zero and finite variance. 
Table 1. Model variables (source: authors’ elaboration)
Variable used in the models Computation Source of data
Gross value added per firm Chain linked volumes (2005), 
million euro/ enterprises
Author own calculation
Gross value added (GVA) Chain linked volumes (2005), 
million euro
Eurostat data [nama_10_a64]
Enterprises (firms) Number Eurostat data [sbs_na_sca_r2]
Gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) 
Chain linked volumes (2005), 
million euro
Eurostat data [nama_10_a64]
Investment rate Percent of GFCF in GVA Author own calculation
Total employment domestic concept Thousand hours worked Eurostat data [nama_10_a64_e]
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The functional form used in the paper was obtained by algebraic manipulation of Eq. (1) 
















A vector of explanatory variables was added to Eq. (2), reflecting the production inputs, 
capital and labour. The explained variable in Eq. (2) was the growth of gross value added per 
firm (constant price, reference year 2005). The paper tested various functional representa-
tions with capital and labour as explanatory variables. Based on the soundness of the statis-
tical results and the economic consistency of the coefficients, the ratio between the capital 
input expressed as the investment rate and the labour input expressed as thousand hours 
worked was used. The ratio is a proxy for capital intensity, which is especially relevant given 
that the analysis focuses on high-technology manufacturing industries. All indicators were 
taken from the Eurostat database. 
3.2. Results and discussions
We have employed two dynamic models using the GMM method to analyze the beta con-
vergence of gross value added in the high-technology manufacturing industries. The results 
of the first model (Table 2) indicate that the β-convergence rate estimate is significant. Gross 
value added is converging in both analysed high-technology manufacturing industries. The 
convergence is higher at 16.4% in the case of the Manufacture of computer, electronic, and 
optical products compared to 2.2% in the case of Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical prod-
ucts and pharmaceutical preparations. This is consistent with the existence of fewer barriers 
and higher exposure to competition in the case of the first analysed sector. The higher expo-
sure to competition is also reflected in the difference between the results of the first analyzed 
sector and the overall real GDP convergence rate of around 2 percent found in the literature 
(Barro et al., 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992; Armstrong & Read, 2002; Rivas & Villarroya, 2016). 
The sign of the capital intensity coefficient, namely, IR_L, indicates the positive impact of 
investment on the sectorial gross value added. The longer time frame needed to pass from 
the product concept to the market in the case of the pharmaceutical sector is reflected in the 
lag of the capital intensity variable.
The convergence club hypothesis was also tested to account for the possible heterogeneity 
between European Union countries. We split the countries into two clusters. The first cluster 
consists of the EU15 countries, which are more developed and innovative, and the second 
cluster represents the countries that joined the European Union after 2004. The decision to 
split the countries into the above-mentioned clusters was also based on the extensive use of 
the EU15 cluster by the Eurostat, the World Bank, OECD, and other institutions to report 
various statistical data. To further substantiate the grouping of the countries, we compared 
the kernel density estimates of the gross value added per firm for the two groups. The EU15 
countries’ distribution displays higher average values compared to the new EU member states’ 
distribution for both analysed high-technology manufacturing industries (see Figure 8). We 
have used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to investigate the statistical significance of the dif-
ference between the distributions. The null hypothesis of the equality of the distribution 
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functions was rejected at the 3% level in the case of Manufacture of computer, electronic, and 
optical products and at 1% level in the case of Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 
and pharmaceutical preparations. The p-value for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was 0.015, 
and the D-Statistics was 0.445 in the case of Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical 
products and 0.0 and 0.75 respectively for the Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 
and pharmaceutical preparations.
We have tested various functional forms for the two high-technology manufacturing in-
dustries, for the EU15 and the new EU member states groupings. The statistical tests applied 
in Table 2 were also applied in this case. The results were significant only for the Manufacture 
of computer, electronic, and optical products.  
The results (see Table 3) indicate that the β-convergence rate is higher for the new EU 
member states at 27.8% compared to 21.9% in the case of the EU15 countries. The higher 
convergence rate in the case of the two analyzed groups compared to the EU28 aggregate, 
reflects existing heterogeneity between countries at the EU28 level (see also Figure 8). The 
impact of the capital intensity variable, namely, IR, is positive and higher in the case of the 
EU15 countries. Several key variables are critical for the success of the high-technology sec-
tors, like the presence of a skilled and educated workforce, a healthy financing environment, 
Table 2. Testing the beta convergence of gross value added in the high-technology manufacturing in-

















P-value for Sargan test 0.00 0.03
Legend: gGVAperfirma – represents the growth of the ratio of value added at factor cost and the number 
of enterprises; IR – represents the ratio between the capital input expressed as the investment rate and 
the labour input expressed as thousand hours worked; S1 – Manufacture of computer, electronic and 
optical products; S2 – Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations.
Note: 1Based on a dynamic panel data model using system GMM estimators. Number of observations 
236;
2 *, **, ***, **** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 3% and 1% level, t statistics in parenthesis;
3AB(1) and AB(2) is the p-value of the Arellano and Bond test for first and second order autocorrela-
tion, respectively;
4The overidentification of the model was tested using the Sargent test.
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and nonrestrictive regulations. These factors are captured in the technological readiness of 
a country as reflected by the Technological readiness indicator developed by The Economist 
Intelligence Unit [EIU] (EIU, 2018, 2020) and the Technological readiness pillar of the Global 
Competitiveness Index developed by the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2017, 2019). The 
rankings of the countries based on their technological readiness (EIU, 2018, 2020; WEF, 
2019) are consistent with our results. At least ten countries out of the EU15 countries are in 
the top 20 in both rankings, while for the new EU member states, Estonia and Czech Repub-
lic are the highest-ranked between the 20th and 30th position. The rankings indicate that the 
EU15 countries have a more homogenous and higher performing technological environment 
than the new EU member states, explaining the higher impact of capital intensity indicated 
by our analysis. This higher impact highlights the gap between the two clusters of countries 
in respect to their capacity to innovate and captures the impact of various factors such as the 
massive brain migration from new member states (Docquier & Rapoport, 2012); the impact 
of education on technology spillover (Benhabib & Spiegel, 2005; Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010; 
Nelson & Phelps, 1965) and the impact of the deficient quality of management.
The positive sign of the capital intensity variable for the new EU member states can be 
seen as a strategic resource that can be used by the new member states to accelerate their 
development. However, this strategic resource should be backed up by improvements in un-
derlying causal factors such as the quality of the workforce and the regulatory environment.
Table 3. Testing the beta convergence of gross value added in the case of Manufacture of computer, 
electronic, and optical products for EU15 and the new EU member states1 (source: Authors calculation 
using STATA 15)
Dependent variable: ln(gGVA per firm)












P-value for Sargan test 0.04 0.03
Legend: gGVAperfirma – represents the growth of the ratio of value added at factor cost and the number 
of enterprises; IR – represents the ratio between the capital input expressed as the investment rate and 
the labour input expressed as thousand hours worked.
Note: 1Based on a dynamic panel data model using system GMM estimators. Number of observations 
141 for the EU1515 member states and 90 for the New EU member states;
2 *, **, ***, **** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 3% and 1% level, t statistics in parenthesis;
3AB(1) and AB(2) is the p-value of the Arellano and Bond test for first and second order autocorrela-
tion, respectively;
4The overidentification of the model was tested using the Sargent test.
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Conclusions
The results of the analysis indicated that the β-convergence is higher for the Manufacture of 
computer, electronic, and optical products compared to the Manufacture of basic pharma-
ceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations, which is consistent with the existence 
of fewer barriers and higher exposure to competition in the case of the first analysed sector. 
Our analysis showed that the high-technology manufacturing activities are predomi-
nantly located in the more developed countries, mainly the EU15 member states. Given the 
high technology sector’s role as an engine of growth and the existing performance differences 
between EU28 countries, we investigated the β-convergence for the EU15 and the new EU 
member states groupings. The results indicated that the new EU member states display a 
higher β-convergence rate than EU15, but also that they have a lower capital intensity. This 
highlights the potential risk of some of the new EU member states becoming laggers in term 
of the underlying factors behind gross value added as investment and labour force. 
Figure 8. Comparative analysis of kernel density estimate distributions for countries in EU15  
and new EU member states in Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical products (a)  
and Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations (b)  
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